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COVID-19 mitigating practices such as ‘hand-washing’, ‘social distancing’, or ‘social
isolating’ are constructed as ‘moral imperatives’, required to avert harm to oneself and
others. Adherence to COVID-19 mitigating practices is presently high among the
general public, and stringent lockdown measures supported by legal and policy
intervention have facilitated this. In the coming months, however, as rules are being
relaxed and individuals become less strict, and thus, the ambiguity in policy increases,
the maintenance of recommended social distancing norms will rely on more informal
social interactional processes. We argue that the moralization of these practices,
twinned with relaxations of policy, may likely cause interactional tension between
those individuals who do vs. those who do not uphold social distancing in the coming
months: that is, derogation of those who adhere strictly to COVID-19 mitigating
practices and group polarization between ‘distancers’ and ‘non-distancers’. In this
paper, we explore how and why these processes might come to pass, their impact on
an overall societal response to COVID-19, and the need to factor such processes into
decisions regarding how to lift restrictions.
Latest reports in the United Kingdom suggest social distancingmeasures will continue for
the remainder of 2020 (Mason & Proctor, 2020), and the likelihood of returning to
‘normality’ appears low. While compliance with COVID-19 mitigating practices (such as
wearingmasks or socially distancing) has been high inmost countries (Hale et al, 2020), it
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remains to be seen whether this holds as the requisite changes become more permanent
and disruptive to daily life (Walker et al, 2020).
As tight regulations around social distancing relax, and immediate threat decreases,
interpersonal differences will likely come to the fore: Some individuals will continue
practising stringent measures under reduced policy interventions, whereas others will
not. Such interpersonal differences, partly fuelled by government communications,
may be perceived as arising from differences in underlying moral values (Everett et al,
2020). Some see it as their moral duty to keep socially distancing, in order to protect
vulnerable fellow citizens from COVID-19 infection (Lewnard & Lo, 2020). Others
may disagree, believing that such actions are immoral and will harm the economy,
increasing unemployment and societal harm in different ways (Sample, 2020).
Furthermore, individuals will likely experience dilemmas between their duty to
adhere to social distancing ‘rules’, and obligations to provide sufficient care for
vulnerable individuals in their community (e.g., visiting isolated elderly people,
supporting protests, or supporting grieving friends). Thus, as we move into a long-
term response to the crisis, COVID-19 mitigating practices are becoming increasingly
moralized around different concerns and in multiple contexts (e.g., physical or mental
health, economic and social). These competing moralizations of mitigating practices
possess a high potential for interpersonal disagreement among the public regarding
the ‘right’ practices to adopt moving forward (Kurz, Prosser, Rabinovich & O’Neill,
2020).
Prior research suggests moral disagreement is a particularly painful and hostile form of
disagreement (Haidt, Rosenberg & Hom, 2003). When both sides of the spectrum feel
their particular preference is the morally correct course of action, the other party is not
just ‘different’ but ‘wrong’ (Goodwin & Darley, 2012). As COVID-19 mitigating
behaviours (such as social distancing or mask wearing) are so strongly seen as morally
relevant practices (Francis & McNabb, 2020), their continued enactment as regulations
ease means potentially walking on socially thin ice. Perceived moral motivation for
behaviour, regardless of specific content of the moral arguments, is enough to produce
defensiveness and self-concept threat in others, which may lead individuals to ‘double-
down’ on their own moralized behaviour and derogate others who behave differently
(Cramwinckel, van Dijk, Scheepers & van den Bos, 2013). In this way, the mere potential
of a moral motivation for a practice is enough to invoke perceptions of judgement and
outrage towards those who behave differently.
Moralization processes can be shaped by multiple sources. Government communi-
cations function as moralized persuasion contributing to the interpretation of newmoral
norms in society (e.g., Rozin, 1999; T€auber, 2018). Moral norms can also be collectively
negotiated informally in social interactions between individuals and within communi-
ties, as seen in community efforts to dissuade visitors to rural areas (Murphy, 2020).
Moralization has been described as a double-edged sword, functioning as a powerful
motivator of behavioural change, but also producing defensiveness and interpersonal
difficulties (Kovacheff et al., 2018; Minson & Monin, 2012; T€auber, 2019). We argue that
these two ingredients of moralization and emerging disagreement about whether to
maintain mitigating practices, form a potent recipe for social interactional trouble, do-
gooder derogation and group polarization. In this paper, we provide an overview of
some of the potential downstream consequences of moralizing COVID-19 mitigating
practices, focusing primarily on group processes and how their potential negative
impacts should be factored into decision-making surrounding continued policy
relaxation.
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What are the social consequences of moralizing practices?
Although moral intuitions and decision-making are commonly investigated at the
individual level, morality also plays a role in regulating the behaviour of individuals
within groups (Ellemers & van den Bos, 2012; Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013). At the
intragroup level, during COVID-19 people are likely interpreting and negotiating novel
moral norms within their ingroups (i.e., at the interpersonal, community, or national
level). This involves attempting to regulate others’ behaviour with regard to these norms,
for example, expressing disapproval of perceived moral violations (Steentjes, Kurz,
Barreto & Morton, 2017). Thus far, social sanctioning has been largely directed at
individuals who do not keep social distance (Tait, 2020). It is, however, conceivable that
as measures relax and voices rejecting perceived restrictive norms grow louder, people
start socially (and economically) sanctioning those who stubbornly keep social distance,
despite reduced threat and relaxed regulations. Moreover, individuals anticipating a
future weakening of restrictions may try to get ahead of the curve and may feel
comfortable relaxing their own behaviours before it is officially advised (Sparkman &
Walton, 2017). This effect could be particularly acute where early relaxation may confer
significant economic or social advantages (e.g., reopening a business, celebrating an
elderly family member’s birthday). So too, when societal authorities (e.g., politicians and
public health officials) fail to give clear and consistent signals in linewith scientific advice:
or violate policies themselveswithout consequence. This introduces further ambiguity to
policies and undermines public trust, confidence and overall adherence to mitigating
practices (Curtis, 2020; Dandekar & Barbastathis, 2020; Jetten, Reicher, Haslam &
Cruwys, 2020).
These intragroup processes may result in negative interpersonal consequences for
people striving to maintain social distancing guidelines, such as anticipated moral
reproach and ‘do-gooder derogation’ (i.e., backlash against individuals perceived as
claiming moral superiority; Monin, 2007; Minson & Monin, 2012). Concerns about
potential derogation in this context may reduce public adherence to recommended
mitigating measures (Lin, Schaumberg & Reich, 2016). This form of derogation may
impact already-vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or immunocompromised, and
increase interactional trouble for those who choose to continue socially isolating. One
could imagine a scenario where an individual is socially ostracized by friends for refusing
to attend a social gathering or challenged for avoiding important in-person workplace
meetings. This ostracism could manifest itself through accusations of ‘poor manners’ or
‘lack of support’, where an individual’s own COVID-mitigating practices are newly
translated by others into perceived social or indeed moral affronts. Thus, previously
neutral behaviours have moved into newly moralized domains (Francis &McNabb, 2020)
and as such can develop social consequences (Williams, 2020) thatmay hasten intergroup
conflict and polarization.
The willingness and ability of some individuals to maintain and advocate continued
mitigating practices are a key component of many governments’ plans to ease strict
lockdownmeasures (WHO, 2020). Despite the importance of these individuals, we argue
that without the support of formal rules and regulations, social interactional trouble may
begin to plague these actors, whomay be perceived as ‘moral rebels’ (e.g., Monin, Sawyer
& Marquez, 2008) and incur significant social and psychological costs. Additionally,
negotiations of moral norms at the community level can also be complicated by moral
dilemmas (e.g., concerning one’s caring responsibilities) and this can be one site where
moralized identities emerge and clash.
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At the intergroup level, it may not yet be obvious that groups are involved in these
processes, since the initial process of moralization typically occurs prior to any
recognizable identity labels (T€auber, 2019). Once a norm is generally accepted, however,
thenon-compliantmaybe viewed as a disruptiveminority of ingroupdeviantswhomaybe
symbolically ’ejected’ from the group and assigned a stigmatizing label (Hales, Ren &
Williams, 2017). This was evident when, at the height of the pandemic, thosewho did not
adhere closely to existing guidelines (e.g., by travelling to second homes or gatheringwith
friends) were stigmatized as ‘non-distancers’ or ‘covidiots’ (Iqbal & Townsend, 2020).
Conversely, as lockdownmeasures relax, theremay bepeoplewho formoral or pragmatic
reasons are unable to return to ‘normal’ (e.g., those who are immunocompromised), who
may then be stigmatized as ’distancers’.
Finally, both theseminority positions have the potential to be re-appropriated as a self-
adopted identity (e.g., ‘I’m aproudDistancer’),which can further contribute to ostracism.
Paradoxically, members of ‘extreme’ groups may be even more likely to attract ostracism
if their group is perceived to be pro-social rather than antisocial (e.g., Hales & Williams,
2019). Thus, moralization of mitigating practices may ultimately lead to new ingroup and
outgroup identities based on adherence to, or flouting of, newly negotiated moral norms;
and to group polarization.
Recent work (Kurz et al, 2020) highlights some of the difficulties faced by those
promoting wide-scale adoption of practices that are ‘moralized’ on account of their
environmental andother collective benefits. They point to potential perils associatedwith
the creation of (practice-based) social identities around these behaviours (e.g., ‘Vegetar-
ians’), stemming from a range of emergent social interactional processes such as ‘Do-
gooder derogation’ (Minson &Monin, 2012). Moreover, they suggest these processes can
render such social identities sticking points to the achievement of societal-level tipping
points in rates of practice adoption. At its peak, COVID-19 arguably represented the
inverse of that social psychological dynamic. We have seen the immediate appearance of
institutionally endorsed normative behavioural practices enacted by the majority in
pursuit of collective (public health) benefit (Jetten, Reicher, Haslam & Cruwys, 2020). As
such, there was initially limited opportunity for social identities to form aroundmoralized
practices and for conflict to emerge between groups enacting different practices. We are
now looking ahead to a period where divergences in people’s interpretations of and
behavioural responses to official guidance may occur. At the height of the pandemic,
people were not disparagingly referred to in social discourse as a ‘hand-washer’ or
‘distancer’. As the crisis lengthens and becomes ‘the new normal’, however, the kinds of
social identity dynamics so commonly observed within other moralized practice domains
are also likely to make an appearance.
An important factor in how people interpret and respond to guidancewill be people’s
different lived experiences of social isolation. These different experiences will in part
reflect how people are positioned structurally (e.g., in terms of gender, race, and class-
based social identities: EuroHealthNet, 2020). There may be significantly more social
interactional tension inherent in a low-paid worker in the gig economy seeking to
minimize social contact in the face of relaxed guidelines, compared to a high-paid office
worker who can more easily maintain social distancing without negative consequences.
Thus, the ability to perform, let alone, to moralize one’s own behavioural practices may
not be equally distributed, and these inequalitiesmay strengthen polarization in emergent
identities.Moreover, there is considerable potential for thesemoralized social identities to
politicize. The beginnings of this process have been seen in ‘anti-lockdown’ protests
around the world (e.g., Italy, the United States, South Africa) around various causes
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including unequal access to food, medicines, and PPE; defence of the economy and
concerns about increasing unemployment; and the protection of individual rights and
civil liberties (Burke, 2020). While some of these protests were directed at ending the
requirement to socially distance, others focused on the failure of governments to facilitate
people’s social distancing practices (e.g., through providing PPE and addressing
inequalities in disease incidence). As lockdown measures ease and attention turns to
the devastation of people’s lives and communities, unrest and the further politicization of
both distancing and non-distancing identities appear likely.
How could individuals, communities, and policymakers address these
issues effectively?
In this section, we discuss social psychological insights that may be useful for considering
how to best support vulnerable people in our communities over the longer term.
What individuals can do?
A gentle approach to interpersonal norm negotiation
Novel moral norms around social distancing are currently being negotiated across
multiple countries and contexts, and debates and argumentation are likely to be a
common element of these negotiations. These processes can be intensified in online
contexts, where it is not possible to read other peoples’ non-verbal cues. Although
ostracism and stigmatization are commonly used strategies to influence the behaviour of
others in one’s community, research suggests this is a painful experience that may push
people towards identifying with other people who also feel excluded and may even
contribute to identity polarization (Hales et al., 2017; T€auber, 2019). Stigmatization can
also sometimes inadvertently punish individuals who have no choice but to engage in the
target behaviour (e.g., an immunocompromised person wearing a mask, in a context
where masks are rare). We would encourage people to be careful of the attributions they
make and to focus on the bestway to collectively and respectfully resolvemoral dilemmas
as they arise. Groups in our communities can also play their part through support and
collective advocacy to ensure social support for the vulnerable (e.g., mutual aid) and to
ensure that those who need to socially distance in their homes, communities, and
workplaces have the means to do so (e.g., trade unions).
What policymakers can do?
Consider the role of moral content in persuasive messaging
Our analysis suggests that it may be important to consider when it is appropriate to use
moral or non-moral messaging to encourage adherence to social distancing practices.
Moral content can be important for creating drastic, rapid behaviour change (van Bavel
et al., 2020); however, in the longer term, moral messages may contribute to social
interactional difficulties and polarization (T€auber, 2019). An alternative or complemen-
tary strategy is to use non-moral or pragmatic messages (Kreps & Monin, 2014; T€auber,
Van Zomeren & Kutlaca, 2015). Such messages could communicate that mitigating
practices have become ‘our new normal’; that is, they are widely accepted in the
community and do not necessarily signal individual moral virtue. A cautiously optimistic
(albeit slightly disquieting) prediction could be that some practices (e.g., substitutes for
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handshaking) will become solidified as ‘simple common-sense’ thus stripped of
significant moral connotations.
Maintain institutional signals
Through signals of what represents the default, institutions can influence behaviour,
without officially enforcing it (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). The 1.5-m spaced floor markings
that have appeared in many public spaces signal that distancing is considered important
(i.e., an injunctive norm). Although organizations maywant to remove thesemarkers, our
analysis suggests benefits in their retention; it may help motivated and vulnerable
individuals to uphold and protect social distance in public settings, and avoid potential
social backlash by others for doing so. Institutional signals (including physical cueswithin
the environment) could help individuals avoid moral disagreement and thus social
interactional trouble.
Consider dynamic norms signalled by policy changes
In addition to signalling current injunctive norms, it is important to consider how
institutional signalsmay also imply a dynamic descriptive norm (e.g., Sparkman&Walton,
2017). Ongoing relaxation of government restrictions could unintentionally imply that
the worst has passed, and society is on a trajectory back to ‘normal’. This may increase
perceptions that only a ‘minority’ are still engaging in social distancing, accentuating the
social difficulties we have discussed. Avoiding this impression is important as it may lead
to people relaxing their practices faster than the guidelines suggest (i.e., pre-conformity
with an anticipated future norm)which in turn communicates amore relaxed descriptive
norm. Rather than rolling back restrictions in a stepwise fashion that implies an
incremental return to ‘normal’, consideration could be given to relaxing the rules via
qualitative steps that still imply a degree of caution is needed. Those engaged in the
difficult task of modelling behavioural outcomes of removing restrictions would also do
well to consider such dynamic-norm-signalling effects.
Conclusion
In summary, the moralization of COVID-19 mitigating practices, combined with
relaxation of regulations, may have significant unintended consequences that impact
people’s ability to maintain practices and social cohesion. We believe the processes
described above are of interest to the social psychological community and should be
studied further. COVID-19 is an exceptional circumstance, but analysis of this moment
may prove useful for the study of other rapid social change efforts surroundingmoralized
practices, such as the climate crisis (Reese et al, 2020).
A critical factor in how well governments and other authorities (e.g., police, health
workers, employers) manage dynamically loosening regulations is their relationship of
mutual trust and respect with all communities (Bradford et al, 2020; De Cremer & Blader,
2006). As lockdown eases internationally, there will be more ambiguity and different
normative practicesmight emerge for different groups and contexts. Recognition of these
challenges in norm negotiation and expressions of trust from authorities are critical: It
communicates that people are regarded as a valued community member and as moral
citizens capable of making moral choices (Renger & Simon, 2011; Tyler & Blader, 2000).
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Moving forward,what is seen asmoral or normativewill be very dynamic and contextually
based. Authorities and individuals must ensure their constructions of what is normative
and moral mesh with people’s lived experiences and their other identity positions. To
prevent unintended consequences in the relaxation of social distancing measures,
individuals, communities, and policymakers should avoid essentializing others as ‘moral’
or ‘immoral’. Instead, we should support dynamic norm negotiation, and empower
people to safely enact practices that protect the health and well-being of themselves and
their community, in the face of potential social interactional and personal difficulties.
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